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INTRODUCTION
On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable (“BRT”) issued a revised
statement on corporate purpose signed by 181 influential chief executive
officers. 1 Entitled “Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’” the
statement notes that the BRT is moving away from shareholder primacy 2
Associate Professor of Business Law and Management, Belmont University, Jack
C. Massey College of Business. The author thanks all of the participants in the University
of Tennessee School of Law’s Business Transactions: Connecting the Threads III
symposium. In particular, the author thanks professor commenter Eric Amarante and
student commenter Phil Reed.
1 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That
Serves All Americans’, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Business
Roundtable Redefines], https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines
-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
2 The term “shareholder primacy” can be used to address the purpose and/or the
governance of corporations. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means
and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (2003) (“[A]ll of these
models are ways of thinking about the means and ends of corporate governance. They
strive to answer two basic sets of questions: (1) as to the means of corporate governance,
who holds ultimate decisionmaking power? and (2) as to the ends of corporate
governance, whose interests should prevail? When the ultimate decisionmaker is
presented with a zero-sum game, in which it must prefer the interests of one constituency
class over those of all others, which constituency wins?”); Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating
Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1537, 1599 (2018) (“[S]hareholder primacy holds that the
shareholders are of utmost importance in thinking about the aims and governance of a
*
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and toward a multi-stakeholder approach. 3 The body of the statement
claims that “[e]ach of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver
value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our
communities and our country.” 4 The statement specifically highlights
customers, employees, suppliers, communities (including the
environment), and long-term value for shareholders as important to
firms. 5 In focusing on a wide range of stakeholders, the BRT’s 2019
Statement departs from the group’s 1997 declaration that “the principal
objective of a business enterprise is to generate economic returns to its
owners.” 6
Reaction to the BRT’s 2019 revised statement on corporate purpose
has been swift and varied. These reactions could be loosely grouped into
one or more of three broad categories--optimistic praise, 7 supportive
corporation.”). The BRT statement appears to use the term “shareholder primacy” in the
first way, addressing the aim of the corporation. While I believe that it is cleaner to use
“shareholder primacy” to address who should govern corporations, so that it lines up
squarely against Stephen Bainbridge’s “director primacy,” which posits that directors
should be in control of the governance of corporations, I will use the term like the BRT
does, to address the ends of a corporation.
3 Business Roundtable Redefines, supra note 2.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Statement on Corporate Governance, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 1997), http://
www.ralphgomory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Roundtable-1997.pdf.
7 See, e.g., Alan Murray, America’s CEOs Seek a New Purpose for the Corporation,
FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/business-round
table-ceos-corporations-purpose/ (“[G]iven the immense power large companies exercise
in society, the new social consciousness of business surely should be seen as a step in the
right direction. At a time when the nation’s political leadership is tied in knots, more
interested in fighting partisan battles than in uniting to solve public problems, business
leadership is filling the leadership vacuum.”); Steven Pearlstein, Top CEOs are Reclaiming
Legitimacy by Advancing a Vision of What’s Good for America, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019,
5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/top-ceos-are-re clai
ming-legitimacy-by-advancing-vision-whats-good-america/ (“[T]oday’s statement by the
Business Roundtable disavowing shareholder primacy is so significant and so welcome.
In the Roundtable’s new formulation of corporate purpose, delivering value to
customers, investing in employees, dealing fairly and honestly with suppliers, supporting
communities and protecting the environment all have equal billing with generating longterm value for shareholders. The statement rejects the whole idea of ‘maximizing’ one
value to the exclusion of all the others. Instead, it acknowledges the need for balance and
compromise in serving all of a company’s stakeholders.”). Professor Eric Amarante, in
his symposium response, suggested a fourth category of “who cares?” I would place
most of the commenters who think that the statement will not amount to much, into the
second category of “supportive pessimism.” Those who do not think the statement will
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pessimism, 8 and blunt opposition. 9 This essay primarily addresses the
second reaction – those who express support for valuing all stakeholders,
move the needle, but think the statement is wrongheaded, I would place in the third
category of “blunt opposition.” Eric Amarante, Commentary on Professor Murray’s Presentation,
21 TENN. J. BUS. L. 273, 273 (2020).
8 See, e.g., David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer
Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html (“There was no mention at
the Roundtable of curbing executive compensation, a lightning-rod topic when the
highest-paid 100 chief executives make 254 times the salary of an employee receiving the
median pay at their company . . . . The Business Roundtable did not provide specifics on
how it would carry out its newly stated ideals, offering more of a mission statement than
a plan of action. . . . ‘If the Business Roundtable is serious, it should tomorrow throw its
weight behind legislative proposals that would put the teeth of the law into these
boardroom platitudes,’ said Anand Giridharadas.”); Jay Coen Gilbert, Andrew Kassoy, &
Bart Houlahan, Don’t Believe the Business Roundtable has Changed Until Its CEOs’ Actions Match
Their Words, FAST CO. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90393303/dontbelieve-the-business-roundtable-has-changed-until-its-ceos-actions-match-their-words (“It’s
time we work together to redesign an economic system for the 21st century that prioritizes
the long term over the short term and the creation of value for all stakeholders, not just
shareholders. Unless we address the systemic context in which CEOs operate, celebrating
their latest announcements about purpose will remain more hope than strategy.”); Katrina
vanden Heuvel, Big Business Is Suddenly Showing a Conscience. But Is That Enough?, WASH.
POST (Aug. 27, 2019, 7:51 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/
08/27/big-business-is-suddenly-showing-conscience-is-that-enough/ (“Worse yet, the
Business Roundtable’s statement offers no hint as to how corporations plan to fulfill to
their newly enlightened purpose . . . . If big corporations want people to believe that
profits are not their only concern, they need to start walking the walk.”); Andrew
Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty Rhetoric?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 30,
2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/08/is-the-business-roundtable-statement-just-emptyrhetoric (“The BRT statement is a nice start. This new discussion of purpose is good,
and it mirrors what some big investors are saying. But we need a much bigger pivot to
circular, renewable-energy-based business models that value the long-term, protect
natural capital, and invest in human development and equality. That level of change is
currently light years beyond the BRT statement.”).
9 See, e.g., David L. Bahnsen, Business Roundtable Pretends to Redefine What a Corporation
Does, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 26, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/
08/business-roundtable-pretends-to-redefine-what-a-corporation-does/ (“If today’s
corporate-responsibility police truly want a free and virtuous society, they are better off
focusing their efforts on eliminating the crony-capitalist abuses that seek to squash
competition.”); Stephen Bainbridge, A Tweet to the Business Roundtable e the Law of Corporate
Purpose, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 19, 2019, 1:59 PM), https:// professor
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2019/08/a-tweet-to-the-business-roundtable
-re-the-law-of-corporate-purpose.html (“Memo to the @BizRoundtable: You don’t get
to ‘redefine’ anything. Only the Delaware courts can change the law of corporate
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but doubt that the companies represented by the BRT will engage in
meaningful change. The pessimism seems to spring from the toothlessness
of the BRT’s statement 10 and the possible hidden motives, such as quieting
activist shareholders 11 or heading off more aggressive stakeholder
governance proposals like Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism
Act. 12 To address the pervasiveness of the pessimism, this essay suggests
purpose. And, as you ought to know, Delaware comes down square on the side of
shareholder wealth maximization.”); The Editorial Board, The ‘Stakeholder’ CEOs, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-stakeholder-ceos11566248641 (“One virtue of the shareholder model is that it focuses the corporate
mission on measurable financial results. An ill-defined stakeholder model can quickly
become a license for CEOs to waste capital on projects that might make them local or
political heroes but ill-serve those same stakeholders if the business falters.”); Steve H.
Hanke, Business Roundtable suffers from economic illiteracy, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2019, 5:24
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/08/28/business-roundtable-suffers
-economic-illiteracy-editorials-debates/2144794001/ (“The Roundtable’s new anticapitalist mission statement promises to dilute and muffle shareholders’ voices and
further politicize corporate governance.”); Nell Minow, Six Reasons We Don’t Trust the New
“Stakeholder” Promise from the Business Roundtable, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Sept. 2, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/02/six-reasons-we-dont-trustthe-new-stakeholder-promise-from-the-business-roundtable/ (“I am skeptical about what
the CEO signatories to this statement have in mind for six reasons . . . . 1. We’ve seen
this before . . . . 2. It does not really mean anything . . . . 3. It is not consistent with the
principles of capitalism . . . . 4. We are waiting to see CEOs put their money where their
mouths are . . . . 5. There is a bait and switch element . . . . 6. Corporations are not
designed for making public policy.”).
10 See, e.g., Helaine Olen, CEOs Don’t Want to be Blamed for Inequality — or do Anything
About It, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/2019/08/22/ceos-dont-want-be-blamed-inequality-or-do-anything-about-it/ (“So should
we celebrate? Well, not so fast. You might notice that this statement does not include any
requests for changes in the law, ironclad promises that they will reduce even further
growth of their out-of-control pay (according to the AFL-CIO, the average S&P 500
CEO earned 287 times what the average worker made last year) or, well, anything that
would make it legally enforceable.”).
11 Ann Lipton, Everything Is About Stakeholders, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Aug. 24, 2019),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2019/08/everything-is-aboutstakeholders.html (“[A]rguments about managers accommodating corporate stakeholders
are frequently code for ‘activist shareholders leave us alone,’ which has little to do with
corporate well-being and everything to do with management entrenchment.”).
12See Press Release, Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introduces-accountable
-capitalism-act; Julie Wittes Schlack, The Business Roundtable Has a Change of Heart? I Think
Not, COGNOSCENTI (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2019/08/28/
the-business-roundtable-corporate-social-responsibility-julie-wittes-schlack
(“Public
corporations are just that — public — and must be subject to the same sorts of
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five possible governance proposals for corporations who take the BRT’s
statement seriously and want to take concrete steps beyond pretty
platitudes. The five corporate governance proposals, set forth in more
detail below, are (1) amend the firm’s corporate purpose in its governing
documents, (2) convert to a benefit corporation, (3) engage in meaningful
social reporting, (4) support legislation that benefits corporate
stakeholders, and (5) give stakeholder representatives corporate
governance rights, such as the right to vote for directors and bring
derivative lawsuits. 13
I. AMEND GOVERNING DOCUMENTS
Socially serious BRT companies could memorialize a multistakeholder corporate purpose statement in their governing documents,
namely their articles of incorporation and bylaws. If the firms are nervous
about whether this departure from shareholder primacy would be allowed
in Delaware, the companies could reincorporate in a more stakeholder
friendly state. For example, Texas and Oregon have made unmistakably
clear that social purposes are allowed for traditional for-profit
monitoring and controls as other public assets. Elizabeth Warren’s legislation, the
Accountable Capitalism Act, would require that corporations with more than $1 billion
in revenue be federally chartered as benefit corporations (or b-corps) — companies that
recognize that their duties extend beyond maximizing profits for shareholders. Call me
cynical, but I suspect that this is precisely what the Business Roundtable is trying to
prevent with its laudable but vague pronouncement.”); see also The Editorial Board, supra
note 10 (“There is also more than a whiff of pre-emptive politics here. The executives—
the Business Roundtable is led by JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon—know they are political
targets. They see socialism on the rise, with Senator Elizabeth Warren proposing to
redefine corporate governance in law with explicit direction to serve ‘stakeholders.’ Her
goal is to redirect corporate capital to serve political goals favored by unions,
environmentalists and trial lawyers. The CEOs no doubt want to get out in front of this
by showing what splendid corporate citizens they are.”); Martin Lipton & Wachtell
Lipton, Stakeholder Corporate Governance Business Roundtable and Council of Institutional
Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 21, 2019), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2019/08/21/stakeholder-corporate-governance-business-roundtable-and
-council-of-institutional-investors/ (“The BRT principles are critical to preserving our
corporate system which relies on the integrity of managements and boards of directors
and on free and open markets. Shareholder primacy was ill-conceived in the first place
and has utterly failed to provide for the needs of all stakeholders. The alternative is state
corporatism in the form of legislation like Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act.
Not many members of the [Council of Institutional Investors] would prefer that.”).
13 Corporations could adopt one or more of these suggestions, and, as noted below,
it is understood that many of these proposals would require shareholder approval.
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corporations. 14 In addition, a majority of states (though not Delaware)
have adopted “other constituency” statutes, which give directors more
latitude to consider nonshareholder stakeholders in decision-making. 15 Of
course, these changes would require support of shareholders, but the
directors could at least put forward the proposals and publicly support
these changes, if the directors were seriously interested in carrying out the
BRT’s 2019 Statement.
II. CONVERT TO BENEFIT CORPORATION
If the directors wish to stay incorporated in Delaware, they could
convert their companies to public benefit corporations (“PBC”). 16
Delaware law requires that PBCs “be managed in a manner that balances
the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially
affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or public
14 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 3.007(d) (West 2017) (“[A] for-profit corporation
may include one or more social purposes in addition to the purpose or purposes required
to be stated in the corporation’s certificate of formation by Section 3.005(a)(3). The
corporation may also include in the certificate of formation a provision that the board
of directors and officers of the corporation shall consider any social purpose specified
in the certificate of formation in discharging the duties of directors or officers under this
code or otherwise.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.047(2)(e) (West 2017) (“The articles of
incorporation may set forth . . . [a] provision authorizing or directing the corporation to
conduct the business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially
responsible”). See generally, Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A Legislator’s Guide to Greening
a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491 (2009).
15 See Mohsen Manesh, Introducing the Totally Unnecessary Benefit LLC, 97 N.C. L. REV.
603, 633–34 (2019) (“Although most large corporations choose to organize under
Delaware law, all businesses have the option to incorporate elsewhere. Outside of
Delaware, thirty-two states have adopted so-called constituency statutes. These statutes
explicitly authorize the directors of a corporation to consider a broad range of factors
affecting nonshareholding constituencies when discharging their statutory duty to
manage the corporation. Some states’ constituency statutes limit a board’s authority to
consider nonshareholder concerns to situations involving the sale or takeover of the
corporation. Other states’ constituency statutes are broader, allowing a board to consider
the impact on nonshareholding constituencies in all matters brought before the board.
In either case, states that have adopted constituency statutes have affirmatively rejected
the notion that a corporate board of directors must consider and pursue shareholder
interests only.” (citations omitted)).
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (West 2020). See generally J. Haskell Murray,
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
345 (2014); Alicia Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting
In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247 (2014).
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benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.” 17 This statutory
requirement to balance the interests of all stakeholders lines up well with
the BRT’s 2019 Statement. 18 Benefit corporation statutes, including
Delaware’s PBC statute, are far from perfect, and do not provide much in
the way of accountability, but the conversion would increase, even if just
slightly, the chance of litigation if directors ignored stakeholders. 19
Directors would have to rally support of at least two-thirds of
stockholders to convert to a PBC, but again, directors could show their
seriousness about the BRT’s 2019 Statement by putting the proposal
forward. 20
Over thirty states now have some form of a benefit corporation
statute, so companies have quite a few options outside of Delaware if they
prefer another state or another version of the legislation. 21 Outside of
Delaware, the vast majority of states have followed the Model Benefit
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 362(a) (West 2020); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
365(a) (West 2020) (“[D]irectors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the
public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the
stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct,
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.”).
18 Business Roundtable Redefines, supra note 2.
19 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (West 2020) (stating that the PBC limits derivative
lawsuits challenging the management of the PBC to stockholders who own at least 2%
of the outstanding shares or at least $2 million in shares of the company. As such, duties
to balance the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders may be underenforced unless
there are large, socially serious shareholders); Elizabeth Schmidt, New Legal Structures for
Social Enterprises: Designed for One Role but Playing Another, 43 VT. L. REV. 675, 713–14 (2019)
(“The issues with the benefit statute are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, there
is not enough guidance to protect directors, and on the other, there is so much protection
of the directors that the mission is not protected . . . . At one level, the purpose statement
does provide directors with some certainty because the articles of incorporation, which
provide the authority to do business in the state, requires the enterprise to have a ‘material
positive impact on society.’ That provides the state’s imprimatur on the stakeholder value
doctrine, which is a major shift. But it is largely a symbolic shift because the statute does
not provide any other guidance to the board members. We do not know what a ‘material
positive impact’ is or how to measure it.” (citations omitted)).
20 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363 (West 2020). (stating that stockholders who do
not vote in favor of the conversion may be entitled to appraisal rights; however, if the
conversion is favorably received, those stockholders could be paid and easily replaced by
additional stockholders).
21 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, https://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last
visited Sept. 6, 2019).

368

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

Corporation Legislation (the “Model”). 22 The Model, and states that
follow the Model, lists the stakeholders that must be considered in director
decision making. 23 The Model’s stakeholder list includes all the stakeholder
groups mentioned in the BRT’s 2019 Statement. 24 The Model also includes
annual benefit reporting requirements, public posting of the reports, and
use of an independent third-party standard in the reporting process, while
Delaware only requires biennial reporting without mandating public
posting of the reports or use of a third-party standard. 25
III. ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL SOCIAL REPORTING
Converting to a benefit corporation would impose some social
reporting requirements, but those statutory reporting requirements are
incredibly weak. 26 Academic articles have shown that less than 10% of
benefit corporations actually produce the required reports in the studied
states, and most statutes have no express penalties for failing to report. 27
22 J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise and Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial
Interests?, 40 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 765, 769 (2017).
23 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301 (2017) [hereinafter MODEL BENEFIT CORP.
LEGIS.],
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%
20_4_17_17.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2019).
24 See id.; Business Roundtable Redefines, supra note 2 (showing that, interestingly, neither
the BRT’s 2019 Statement nor the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation lists creditors
as stakeholders to be considered).
25 Compare MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401–402, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 366(b). (noting that the Delaware statute does, however, specifically allow PBCs to
mandate annual reporting, public posting, and use of a third-party standard in the PBC’s
certificate of incorporation or bylaws). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c).
26 See John Tyler, et al., Producing Better Mileage: Advancing the Design and Usefulness of
Hybrid Vehicles for Social Business Ventures, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 264 (2015)
(“Although benefit corporations must assess themselves against a third party standard
(which may or may not be weak or meaningful) and publish a benefit report, failure to
comply with the underlying standards is not actionable legally.” (citing MODEL BENEFIT
CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2013))).
27 See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 26,
31–32 (2015) (“Data from early benefit corporations shows an abysmal benefit report
compliance rate (below ten percent), drawing into question the claims about heightened
transparency . . . . Currently, a minority of states require filing the report with a government
entity; a majority of states do not. A few states have expressly stated penalties for failing
to produce a benefit report, but most states have not stated a specific penalty and may be
relying on the broad benefit enforcement proceedings to enforce the reporting
requirements.” (citations omitted)); see also J. Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee’s for-Profit

2020]

CORPORATE PURPOSE AND THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE

369

The benefit corporation statutes are also incredibly loose on the reporting
requirements, mandating narrative descriptions rather than any specified
data or metrics. 28
Directors who are serious about benefiting all stakeholders could
direct the corporation to engage in more detailed social reporting, looking
to the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), ISO 26000,
or another similar framework for guidance. 29 Alternatively, or in addition,
directors could start by simply supporting existing shareholder proposals
that suggest studies and reports on various social issues like human rights
abuses within the corporation’s supply chain and the corporation’s
contribution to climate change. 30
IV. SUPPORT STAKEHOLDER LEGISLATION
Directors may retort that supporting stakeholders at the expense of
shareholders could put the company at a competitive disadvantage,
torpedoing the entire company and harming all stakeholders in an eventual
bankruptcy. As such, directors could, as Lawrence Summers has

Benefit Corporation Law, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 325, 340 (2017) (“Of the 134 domestic forprofit benefit corporations in Tennessee, only 30 were formed before May 1, 2016. Of
those 30, none had a published or available benefit corporation report.”).
28 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401–402.
29 SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.sasb.org/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2020); see also MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(c). See generally THE B
IMPACT ASSESSMENT, https://bimpactassessment.net/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2020)
(showing that while the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation does require use of a
“third party standard” in reporting, it does not require certification, nor does it require
any specific data be reported).
30 See Ann Lipton, Everything is About Stakeholders, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG, (Aug. 24,
2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2019/08/everything-is-aboutstakeholders.html (“Indeed, the BR is currently fighting to make it harder for
shareholders to introduce proposals that would force corporations to focus on – you
guessed it – stakeholder interests, so this looks a lot less like an issue of what is best for
society than about who should be the decisionmaker.”); see also Subodh Mishra, An Early
Look at 2019 US Shareholder Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 5,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/05/an-early-look-at-2019-us-shareholder
-proposals/ (“Taking a closer look at the top 10 [shareholder] proposal types by number
of filings in 2019, we see many of the same proposals that were part of this list in the
previous year, including requests to report on political contributions and lobbying,
requests to disclose targets on carbon emissions, and proposals seeking reporting on
sustainability and climate change risks.”).
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suggested, champion stakeholder-focused legislation. 31 Supporting such
legislation would come with some expense, but could change the
competitive landscape and may prevent socially-focused firms from
operating at a disadvantage. Many corporations already support lobbyists,
and, in fact, the BRT itself is largely a lobbying group. 32 If the 181
corporate executives who signed the BRT’s 2019 Statement are serious
about benefiting all stakeholders, lobbying for laws that benefit those
stakeholders would go a long way toward convincing the public that the
statement is more than mere happy talk. 33
V. PROVIDE STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES WITH RIGHTS
Finally, and perhaps most effectively, directors could provide for
stakeholder representatives with rights that would give these
representatives not just a voice, but also power in the corporation. This
proposal is argued in much more detail in my 2017 American Business Law

31 See Lawrence H. Summers, If Business Roundtable CEOs Are Serious About Reform,
Here’s What They Should Do, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2019, 5:57 PM), https:// washington
post.com/opinions/if-business-roundtable-ceos-are-serious-about-reform-heres-whatthey-should-do/2019/09/02/53b05014-cdc0-11e9-8c1c-7c8ee785b855_story.html (“If
the Business Roundtable is serious about stakeholder capitalism, and if responsible firms
are to flourish and spread their benefits, it will not just decree principles according to
which its firms will operate but will also push for laws and regulations that support firms’
ability to stand up for their stakeholders. These might include minimum-wage and
benefits requirements and broader mandates to protect companies that want to do right
by their workers from those competing companies that are ruthlessly pursuing
shareholder interests. Or they might include rigorous restrictions on advertising and
promotion practices, so firms who are honest and transparent are not placed at a
competitive disadvantage. Or universally high capital standards on financial institutions,
so that imprudent willingness to take on risk cannot be a competitive advantage.”).
32 See Donnovan Andrews, 5 Ways Companies Can Show Their Commitment to Improving
the World, FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/09/24/
business-roundtable-corporate-social-responsibility/ (noting that the BRT is a “lobbying
group”); see also lan Rappeport & Thomas Kaplan, Democrats’ Plans to Tax Wealth Would
Reshape U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/01/us/politics/sanders-warren-wealth-tax.html (referring to the BRT as “a lobbying
group for large companies”).
33 See Reuters, Walmart’s Chief Executive to Chair the Business Roundtable, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/business/18reuters-walmartmcmillon-business-roundtable.html (explaining that the BRT has been accused of doing
the exact opposite of this proposal and “lobbying against social and environmental reform
efforts.” (emphasis added)).
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Journal article. 34 In short, that article does not propose providing all
stakeholders with corporate governance rights, as that would be unwieldy.
Rather, the article suggests that each corporate stakeholder group could
elect a representative to act on its behalf. 35 Providing significant corporate
governance rights to stakeholder representatives—such as the ability to
elect directors or sue derivatively—would require shareholder consent, but
directors could engage in consultations with stakeholder representatives
immediately. Directors could also provide stakeholder representatives with
information rights and could engage in stakeholder update calls, as they
currently do for shareholders.
CONCLUSION
Many commentators are rightfully skeptical of the BRT’s 2019 revised
statement of corporate purpose that moves away from shareholder
primacy and toward a multi-stakeholder approach. If, however, the BRT
members are actually serious about valuing nonshareholder stakeholders,
the BRT members could increase their credibility by attempting to
implement some of the corporate governance changes proposed and
discussed in this article.

See generally J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J.
61 (2017).
35 Id. at 98–105.
34

